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A SIMPLE PROPOSAL TO RESOLVE THE
DISRUPTION OF COUNTERPARTY RISK
IN SHORT-TERM CREDIT MARKETS
          
In the middle of September 2008, a year after the subprime crisis broke, Washington announced
the imminent collapse of U.S. financial markets, which would bring with it conditions similar to
those during the Great Depression. The cause? Lending channels were “clogged” with extraordi-
nary numbers of impaired mortgage-backed securities (MBS) on the balance sheets of financial
institutions. The fear was that nonfinancial businesses would be unable to fund productive activ-
ities supporting growth and employment.Officials recommended a solution whereby the govern-
ment would take these questionable assets off the institutions’ balance sheets. However, it was far
from certain that this action would provide the relief sought.
The major problem threatening the stability of the U.S. financial system is impaired risk
assessment caused by the default of many mortgage-backed assets, yet it is not clear that remov-
ing them will make it easier to assess counterparty risk in short-term credit markets. But this
should be the first objective of policy, since these markets provide the basic liquidity support for
institutions operating in the financial markets and, presumably, for the day-to-day operations of
businesses and manufacturers.
The new financial architecture, which buttressed the “new consensus” in monetary theory,
was to have eliminated the possibility of a 1930s-style business cycle by providing a more rational
and efficient distribution of risk through the use of new risk-based capital requirements and new2 Policy Note, 2008 / 4
risk-specific financial instruments.The proof was the decline in
the volatility of real variables, such as growth and employment,
as well as the reduction in risk spreads relative to risk-free gov-
ernment securities.It is clear that this system has broken down:
insteadofriskbeingtransferredtothosemostabletobearit,ithas
beentransferredtothosemostwillingtobearitinordertoreceive
income. As a result of their failure to meet their commitments
to bear this risk, many financial institutions have declared
insolvency, merged with other institutions, or been national-
ized. This has created a general distrust of counterparties to any
financial transaction. As taught by John Maynard Keynes, the
only possible way to quell disquietude over the creditworthiness
of a counterparty in these circumstances is to hold cash rather
than to lend it at interest if the return at maturity is uncertain.
This is absolute liquidity preference, in which there is no interest
rate that will offset the fear of failure to complete the contract.
Building on the works of Keynes and Irving Fisher,Hyman
P. Minsky pointed out that this situation leads to a process of
asset liquidation and debt deflation, whereby liabilities increase
at a faster rate than the sale of assets to meet those liabilities.This
processquicklyleadstosystemwideinsolvencyandbankruptcy—
the Armageddon envisioned by Treasury Secretary Henry M.
Paulson and Fed Chairman Ben Bernanke. The problem is that
their solution starts at the wrong end—with the devalued assets
resulting from debt deflation, rather than the absolute liquidity
preference caused by the failure to assess counterparty risk with
confidence.
As Keynes noted, one way to solve the problem is to hold
money,and one way to prevent this from completely disrupting
asset prices is to meet the (money) demand of the financial insti-
tutions. While this response solves the problem of counterparty
risk (i.e.,a dollar bill or a Treasury bill loaned to the government
is riskless), it does not solve the problem of reducing counter-
party risk in interbank transactions. The government proposal
aims to reduce the risk to all financial institutions by offering to
take impaired assets off their balance sheets,under the assump-
tion that this offer will reduce the risk of contracts not being
met. But there is no reason for this to be the case, as the plan
will do nothing to replenish the reduction in bank capital when
assets are purchased at market value. Given the difficulties in
raising capital under the current (abysmal) conditions, capital
can only be increased by reducing the size of balance sheets fur-
ther; that is, less lending, rather than more.
However,there is a much simpler way to deal with counter-
party risk, one that follows the pattern of organized derivative
exchanges.The purchaser of a futures contract does not have to
assess the risk of completion by the seller, since the exchange
acts as an intermediary, monitoring and hedging risk by means
of margin payments and position limits. In the interbank mar-
ket, the Fed could play the same role as the exchange clearing-
house. This could be achieved by enacting the already-approved
measure permitting the Fed to pay interest on the gross reserve
deposits of member banks. Instead of holding Treasury bills in
order to build liquidity,banks could hold deposits with the Fed.
It would be the equivalent of the Fed issuing its own interest-
bearing notes. Under normal circumstances, banks make loans
andthenseektoraisethelegalreservesrequired,sotheFedwould
have those resources to lend to member banks seeking additional
balances. The counterparty for both transactions would be the
Federal Reserve, so banks would not have to assess the counter-
party risk of borrowers.The Fed guarantee would take the place
of the Treasury’s $700 billion bailout, and existing regulatory
supervisionwouldtaketheplaceof counterpartyriskassessment.
This approach has an additional advantage, in that lending in
both the Fed funds and private interbank markets is unsecured.
The Fed, as counterparty, eliminates the associated risks of
interbank lending, thus reducing short-term interest rates and
restoring confidence in the interbank market.
In addition, in order to support bank lending to nonfinan-
cialmembersaswellasnonmembersof thefederalfundsmarket,
the Fed could return to the“real bills”doctrine by lending in full
againstcommercialloansattheFedrate.Thisapproachwouldbe
facilitated by the unification of the federal and discount rates.
A supplement to this proposal would include support of
the banks’ core deposit base by removing the Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation (FDIC) limit to match the unlimited
guarantee recently given to money market funds. Those who
argue that this might erode the deposits of money funds should
remember that banks usually provide backup credit lines for
those funds. Additionally, member banks should be allowed to
borrow from the Fed an unlimited amount without collateral,
to eliminate the possibility that larger banks could dominate
the market for retail deposits at the expense of smaller banks.
This provision should not increase the government’s risk, since
the Fed and other regulators already exercise control over lend-
ing exposures and capital ratios.The Levy Economics Institute of Bard College 3
This proposal should resolve the problem of assessing coun-
terparty risk and restore short-term lending without government
funding, asset pricing, or approval of a bailout package. All it
requires is Congressional approval to eliminate the cap on
member banks’insured deposits,to bring forward the introduc-
tion of interest payments on deposits, and to extend FDIC
insurance to any unsecured lending of Fed deposits at member
banks. Once short-term markets are functioning, the problem
of recapitalizingsoundbanksandrevivingunsoundbankscanbe
approached (preferably by the FDIC or an agency similar to the
Hoover-eraReconstructionFinanceCorporation).Moreover,the
issue of cascading home foreclosures could be dealt with
through an agency modeled after the Home Owners’ Loan
Corporation of the 1930s.The response does not need to be for-
mulated under threat of the financial system’s imminent col-
lapse due to the dislocation of short-term credit markets.
This approach would also clear the way for policy to prevent
the decline in employment from rationalizing the financial sector
by supporting employment in the manufacturing and service sec-
tors. As emphasized by Minsky, policies should be designed to
minimize the creation of additional financial assets and greater
financial instability.He would suggest a government employment
guarantee program that provides direct income support while
increasingtheproductionof usefulgoods.Itwouldbeparticularly
appropriate to resolve the infrastructure gap in the U.S.economy.
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